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China and postcolonialism 
Re-orienting all the fields 
Daniel F. Vukovich 
The essays collected here for InterDisciplines are most welcome, not least 
because they are interdisciplinary and this is absolutely something that 
postcolonial studies must always aspire to be. The sheer scale, complexity, 
and historical diversity of modern colonialism and empire demand 
interdisciplinarity, and not only their effects on the colonized but also 
the responses of the colonized to empire—e.g., nationalism, Occidentalism, 
nativism, socialism, liberalism—call forth any number of theoretical or 
interpretive questions that are clearly imperative and fundamental for the 
study of history, politics, society, and for the global academy in general. 
Still more subtly, there is at work in these essays the central concern of 
postcolonial studies: the connections between the colonial or imperial 
past (or present) and the present moment or present context and events. 
While the field’s buzzwords may be more immediately familiar (hybridity, 
orientalism, imagined communities, and so on) postcolonial studies is 
always, if often implicitly, a historical and comparative pursuit: how does 
that colonial or, say, anti-imperial past live on in the present, and to what 
effect? How to amend this through decolonization of »minds« and societies 
and polities, and is that even a worthwhile goal today?  
And yet postcolonial studies has mostly developed outside of the 
interpretive social sciences (and outside China Studies), which represents 
a missed opportunity indeed. The postcolonial field needs them, and vice 
versa. This is one reason why this special issue is a significant one. What 
is especially noteworthy is a shared emphasis in these essays on certain 
internalizations or assimilations of colonial discourse and problems and 
on clear, if challenging, case studies about the impact and subsequent 
response of China to the West: the relation to a modern (faster) temporality 
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and, I would add, a catch-up mentality (Meinhof); the embrace of new 
weapon technologies and the re-articulation (my term) of violence as essential 
to sovereignty (Zhu); a certain competition with liberal political scientists 
to »claim« Chinese white collar professionals as their own (loyal to the 
PRC and not »democratic«) (Yan); and the difficult and protracted and 
demanding efforts to articulate a hybrid and individualized identity that 
subverts »Chineseness,« itself a »gift« that arises from contact with the 
diaspora and the foreign and hence the empire (Sandfort).  
It is worth noting at the outset that the »post« in postcolonial does not 
signify a break with or end of colonialism, as if all its effects and 
remaking of worlds simply disappeared on the morning after liberation 
and the exit of the Caucasians or, say, the Japanese. That »post« is akin 
to a fencepost that quite crucially keeps both sides of an edifice or a 
territory intact; it partakes of both sides. »Post« as a break or end is 
exactly what is in question within postcolonial studies, itself in many 
ways a response to the failures of decolonization and national liberation 
in a new age of imperialism or globalization. This is admittedly a counter-
intuitive usage (and many people think colonialism is in the past), but 
that emphasis on continuity and change is a productive one and is, one 
should think, ripe for historical sociologies. After all, what is Edward Said 
(via Michel Foucault, Antonio Gramsci, Giambattista Vico, and of course 
Palestine) doing in 1978’s Orientalism if not offering a kind of sociology 
of knowledge, in empirical and concrete though not »scientific« terms?  
Wide-ranging and moving from the theoretical or generally abstract to 
the concrete or empirical, the essays here are all effective interventions 
into the question of China and postcolonialism. The Introduction to this 
volume has usefully and lucidly explicated the essays and situated them 
in the larger field of the postcolonial. The essays do not seek to persuade 
us that the postcolonial turn needs to happen—a debate at any rate—in 
China and the social sciences or Sinology fields abroad, though taken 
together they do suggest that this is a ripe and fruitful prospect indeed. I 
would thus like to use the space allotted me here to reflect further on 
why postcolonialism matters, and why China matters for postcolonialism, 
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as well as to reflect on why the social sciences need a postcolonial turn 
(and vice versa, to be sure).1  
And yet for scholars working within the humanities and to a lesser extent 
within the discipline of history, my posing of these questions will sound 
somewhat dated: the postcolonial turn, immediately following other 
»theoretical« turns following structuralism and post-structuralism in the 
1970s (notably the work of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, and 
thence Edward Said and Gayatri Spivak) and the rise of multicultural-
ism and feminism, has transformed the study of literature and culture 
(including film) and—despite ongoing resistance in some quarters—
history. At the risk of sounding triumphal (though surely this is all far 
more to the good than the bad), so self-evident is this academic 
transformation that there is no need to even debate the relevance of the 
post- or the full-on colonial to the study of national let alone world 
literature, culture, and history. One need only peruse the syllabi, course 
offerings, and publication lists and keywords of most sizeable universities 
and faculties across the world. Even the discipline of history, probably 
the most »resistant to theory« and interpretation of all the humanities 
fields, has long had a foot in the study of colonialism and empire, for the 
obvious reason that these last are arguably the major single story (»archive«) 
of modernity, alongside the rise of capitalism. Thus the subfield of 
world history has long had a small but brilliant, radical wing of scholars 
documenting the histories of the British and French empires, for 
example (Sydney Mintz, E.R. Wolf). Suffice it to mention, as well, names 
such as Walter Rodney and Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank and the 
world systems school, and many others. 
In sum, while specific academic disciplines are always, as disciplines, 
resistant to paradigm shifts and new rules of discourse, some few but 
noteworthy scholars working within global historical or world-spanning 
                                                
 
1  Parts of this response draw on my forthcoming book Illiberal China 
(Palgrave) as well as Vukovich (2015). 
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studies never needed a postcolonial turn. They were already there. In fact 
post-colonial studies has always been remarkably open about what and 
who can be included under its umbrella—Rodney and Amin and all of 
the above, surely, and even the productive critics of the field such as 
Timothy Brennan. Even Edward Said always insisted that what he was 
saying about the impact of orientalism as a field of knowledge-power had 
long been known, if unremarked and made invisible, and the critique had 
long been made by others before him (e.g., Abdel-Malek). (I leave to one 
side here the historians who have themselves helped constitute the field 
of postcolonial studies, e.g., the Subaltern Studies historians of South 
Asia). None of this should be taken as a rebuke of postcolonial studies as 
a mere fad (and it is a few decades old now in any case), but as confirmation 
of the field’s point, as against how universities typically organize and 
produce knowledge: the modern colonialism and empire are, and should 
be seen as foundational to almost everything we know about »the world« 
and »world history« as well as what we now call globalization, from the 
rise and spread of capitalism, to the flows of people and goods and 
problems and riches and ideas in and out of societies. In other words 
postcolonialism is not just an academic »thing« but a worldly condition, in 
fact a set of conditions and traditions bequeathed by a long history of 
modern empire and »globalization.« And it must also be said that 
postcolonial studies, as opposed to, say, more conventional historical or 
political economic work (as invoked above), represents a more theoretical 
and generalizing project.  
China as  postcolonial 
Within China, as the authors of the Introduction note, »postcolonialism« 
as a critical or at least theoretical term is widespread, with hundreds of 
citations in, say, 2016. (In my own experience, the term itself and critique 
of the West are less popular in China’s two former colonial enclaves, 
Macau and Hong Kong, or get inverted to mean critique of the Communist 
Party-state’s otherwise undeniable sovereignty; this no doubt speaks to a 
certain attachment to the Western/liberal/colonial worldview stemming 
from the former era’s educational apparatuses and political culture as 
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well as to China’s difficult and epochal rise.) They also aptly describe 
postcolonial discourse in China as »vast and heterogeneous,« and I 
would like to amplify that a bit here. The mainland intellectual political 
culture (to use a phrase from Said) is itself in many ways postcolonial in 
two fundamental senses. It is deeply concerned with »becoming-the-same« 
as the modern, advanced West (if not outperforming it and »winning«) and 
with never forgetting—via education and propaganda institutions—the 
era of national humiliation, that is, the era of near-colonialism, the collapse 
of the dynastic system, disunity and chaos, and Japanese invasion. China’s 
encounter with modernity came in the form of a very real imperialism, a 
professed and then militarily demonstrated Western »superiority« (as the 
contribution by Lilli Zhu makes clear to us). There simply would be no 
PRC and Chinese communist revolution without this; thus the typical 
liberal injunction to stop talking about imperialism in favor of the PRC’s 
lack of democracy (»free elections«), liberalism, human rights, and so on 
in China always misses the point of continuing Chinese nationalism and 
the mainland’s resistance to Western intellectual »aid.« That the »never 
forget the era of humiliation« slogan is indeed propaganda (a propagated 
truth sanctioned by the state and political mainstream) does not make it 
false, or less than true. It must also be said that anti-imperialist conscious-
ness is strong in China even today, if in less political (internationalist, 
Marxist) and more starkly nationalist terms than some might like (including 
the present author). Given the sanctioned ignorance involved, the spread 
of the global/foreign media (English- and Chinese-language alike) in 
China has if anything only made nationalism more intense. »Imperialism 
and Chinese politics,« to borrow a famous title from the late »official« 
historian Hu Sheng, is still a real discourse and active historical narrative 
in the mainland, and in this sense China is arguably more connected to 
its anti-imperialist past than, say, India or many countries in Africa that 
typically count as the representative places of postcolonial studies (since 
they were completely colonized and lost sovereignty).  
That the PRC has also been adamantly and enthusiastically embracing free, 
global trade for decades now does not actually contradict this, at least in 
the PRC’s own terms and presumably many of its citizens’ terms, even if 
Vukovich, China and postcolonialism InterDisciplines 1 (2017) 
 
 
 
 
150 
it defies conventional Marxist thought. That one place’s contradictions 
or paradoxes (or even hypocrisies) may not be another’s may not be 
understood or interpreted the same way, may sound a cliché, or alterna-
tively, like a bad relativism in the face of certain universal truths. One 
version of this is a certain debate that will be familiar to anyone following 
media or even »expert« reports on contemporary China: »China has its 
own tradition/system/culture« versus »The CCP is an illiberal regime 
that only seeks to keep itself in power at any cost.« Neither side of this 
gets specific enough, and both present a number of monoliths (the 
tradition, only self-interested). But postcolonial studies must be defined as 
working against universalisms; this is in many ways the point of the field 
as a whole, and where it intersects with, say, post-structuralist theory, 
with radical historicism or pragmatism, and of course, a rather ancient 
and therefore fundamental and unavoidable—and compelling—debate 
over universalism versus particularism. While individual scholars may 
differ, naturally, the field as a whole does militate against universalisms 
(liberal, humanist, or otherwise) in no small part because colonialism itself 
always presented itself as a beneficent civilizing mission or, alternatively, 
as a white man’s burden to help or contain the darker, different races 
(races being defined as universally true and actually existing). Provincializing 
Europe, as Dipesh Chakrabarty memorably put it years ago now, is the 
mandate but—as often goes ignored—that goal is also meant to be seen 
as an incredible challenge that is by no means easy to actually think. As 
with orientalism—think of the many lives and afterlives of notions of 
Chinese cruelty and Asian »despotism«—these structures of knowledge 
production do not just blow away with some corrosive wind from the mind. 
Hu Sheng’s work (which naturally became less radical over a very long 
and productive career) may represent an official academic line of some 
type (Hu was a significant Party member throughout his life) and a 
nationalist history; it may therefore scare off those Westerners who 
loathe the state on principle. But as any reader could see (his work has 
existed in English for decades), it is also serious, reputable scholarship. 
His massive two-volume study From the Opium War to the May 4th Movement 
(1991) is a monument to PRC (or Chinese Communist Party) political-
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intellectual culture and academe, which is often thought, wrongly, to be 
akin to the former Soviet Union at its worst (e.g., Lysenko). That readers 
(of English) worldwide know, for example, Eric Hobsbawm—a genuinely 
great historian, to be sure—but not Hu, or have wrestled with the 
foreignness and complexities of, say, the Indian Subalternists but not 
Tsinghua’s Wang Hui, is an index of Eurocentrism and the dominance 
of the Western academy, and is moreover something of a problem for a 
world that is quickly becoming multipolar again in some sense, with 
China a global factor and presence far beyond cheap exports and capital 
flight. Why is China in such a competition with the West, even as it 
embraces trade and US dollars, and why does it keep »resisting« or »not 
forgetting« the wars, hot and cold, of the past? Is it simply brainwashing 
and communist colonizations (to invoke two actually current terms 
amongst the Hong Kong intelligentsia)? That was a rhetorical question, 
if it needs said, and the point is that we cannot understand the PRC or 
its politics without recourse to the impact of and reaction against the 
West. In fact an awareness of not only this general imperial history – one 
that removed China from being at the center of the world system and its 
»intellectual political culture« to its periphery—but of Western intellectual 
and political arrogance (sanctioned ignorance) is practically common 
sense among many critical Chinese intellectuals and citizens (of course 
not all). This brings us to the Chinese left intelligentsia, new and old, and 
their lack of a comparable impact—as yet—within global academe.  
If China were ever to have a globally influential school of historical and 
theoretical discourse akin to India’s subaltern studies project (itself 
influenced by Indian Maoism/Naxalites at one point) or Western/French 
post-structuralism, then past works such as Hu’s and older Maoists’ as 
well as contemporary works—broadly leftist or heterodox if non-liberal-
dissident writing—would be the starting point. It makes for a striking 
comparison. The Chinese experience involves Marxist intellectuals and 
»national« historians concerned with the relations between imperialism, 
the last dynasty, and the early Republic as well as rebellion and growing 
class and national consciousness, culminating in the rise of the Communist 
Party and eventually the 1949 revolution. One then has an actual revolution 
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and Sinified Marxist/Maoist movement that succeeds and must then get 
on with state building and reconstructing the national economy, preserving 
borders, and even somehow continuing the revolution—and supporting 
global anti-imperialism—after 1949. There was precisely no script for 
this, the Soviet and American paths having been declared off-limits by 
the late 1950s. But the South Asian project is in many ways writing 
against national histories and official (and Eurocentric) Marxisms and 
reductionist class analyses. They are concerned with colonialism’s (and 
modernity’s) lack of impact among the rural masses (»dominance without 
hegemony« in Ranajit Guha’s phrase). The new Chinese intellectuals, 
after their revolution, were very much interested in modernizing and 
developing not only nationalism and class analyses/politics but also with 
transforming the countryside away from backwardness and feudalism and 
toward some egalitarian future. Both »schools« can in theory be construed 
as founts of postcolonial theory and post-orientalist historiography.  
Yet while both are deeply informed by a Marxist-Maoism (more powerfully 
in the Chinese case), it is only the latter, South Asian-based work that 
has had an impact in global academe. And regardless of one’s specific 
evaluations of such work, whether one agrees with e.g. Guha or Dipesh 
Chakrabarty in all the details, the bringing in of South Asian history and 
social and political problems, and the development of theoretical debates 
in response, has only deepened and widened the academic conversation 
in welcome ways. Maoism itself certainly had a great impact on Third 
World radical movements and thus on actually existing, anti-imperialist 
national liberation movements; it also impacted certain French Marxists 
such as Louis Althusser and Alain Badiou, as has been amply discussed 
elsewhere. But Maoism, as an explicit ideology and set of political-
economic practices, has also been overthrown in the PRC for three 
decades now, and the former Chairman himself has been vilified in most 
academic and pulp biographies and histories. So while one might think 
that, for postcolonial theory, Mao Zedong might serve as a Chinese or 
»Asian« Franz Fanon, this has not been the case, certainly not outside of 
China at all. And yet, that anti-imperial, revolutionary discourse nonetheless 
lives on in a »Chinese« insistence that it can or is taking an alternative 
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path to liberal democracy of the Western type (a point also made here in 
the Introduction).  
The New Left and other heterodox thinkers—including some version of 
neo-Confucian or neo-traditional thinking—in Chinese academe today, 
as lively and serious as they are, are likewise not well placed to have a 
Subalternist or British-historian, Hobsbawm-like impact on Western 
intellectual production. At least not yet. While it is true that they do not 
invoke postcolonial terms as much as other academics, and for that 
matter are, in contrast to the Western academy, more rooted in the social 
sciences, I would argue that they are nonetheless a significant, postcolonial 
or counter-Eurocentric development. They are best understood as both 
an indigenous Chinese intellectual movement or »scene« and a subtle but 
firm riposte to a political orientalism that demonizes the Chinese revolution 
in general and Mao era socialism in particular. This is precisely what is at 
stake in their equality-based or egalitarian and communitarian critiques of 
the reform era and the hyper-marketization (or privatization or commodi-
fication) of the Chinese economy. Both that »liberal« economic turn of 
the state away from state socialism and the global discourse of political 
liberalism as what China lacks and needs are the objects of their critique. 
Outside of a small but not insignificant number of scholars based in 
Western academe, it is only the new left (broadly defined) that is making 
such a critique of the reform era as such and China’s turn to capitalism. 
Importantly, much of the Chinese new left also breaks with a major 
political plank in Western and global political thinking: it is resolutely 
pro-state and seeks to retain and enhance, not cut back or avoid, state 
capacity. Neo-liberalism, that American- and Austrian-based product, is 
of course anti-state in the name of the just and spontaneous order of the 
market, but this also resonates all too clearly with the general anti-statism 
of—it must be said—that very same French-inspired post-structuralism 
and quasi-anarchisms that inform the Western »left« intellectual political 
culture.  
From a global standpoint, this pro-»statism« is as close to an older 
European social-democratic tradition as to a Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. 
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But in any case it represents a welcome challenge to current state-phobic 
doxa nearly everywhere else. Yet one must note that theirs are not just 
economically or even sociologically based arguments (though they are 
that); they are also aimed at universalism and Eurocentrism, as the work 
of Wang Hui in particular makes clear.  
Wang’s work on the problem of Tibet as well as his volumes on Chinese 
modernity are particularly salient here. Wang argues that the Western 
fascination with Tibet and freeing Tibet from China is partly rooted in 
orientalism, a claim that is surprisingly controversial or somehow 
irrelevant to conventional China »experts.«2 Moreover, the resolution of 
the crisis—and it is one, for Tibetans and China alike—would be better 
approached not through independence and modern (and Western) nation-
state borders for Tibet, but through the Mao-Zhou Enlai formulations 
(from the 1950s) of relative autonomy under a more traditional, empire-
era form of suzerainty. (This is not at all what the contemporary state 
has been doing, but rather the opposite: a type of de facto, planned 
assimilation through »development« and Han migration across a tight 
border.) There are historical or contextual grounds for this Mao-Zhou 
strategy as well as a more general or »theoretical« argument that it is 
precisely those modern notions of discrete, authorized borders, and of 
the illusory ideals of full autonomy and »real« sovereignty, not to 
mention the logic of purity and monoculture that subtends modern 
nation-states, that create as many problems as they solve in such 
situations of complex, overlapping territories. Wang’s views on Tibet and 
on orientalism (or Western chauvinism) are fairly common within Chinese 
intellectual circles, though they are sure to bother others who would, in 
turn, speak for Tibetans in Tibet and who also want to gift them a 
sovereign, modern nation-state of their own. But Wang’s focus on empire 
and suzerainty is nonetheless a challenge to what is undeniably a modern 
Eurocentric view of the necessity and normativity of modern nation-states 
                                                
 
2  See for example Sebastian Veg’s (2009) review of Wang Hui’s essays on 
Tibet. 
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as opposed to empire states or civilizational states. China and its peripheries 
are no doubt a mix of both such entities, old and new, and therefore its 
socio-political solutions and forms must follow suit. What if the former, 
modern paths, in this Chinese case at any rate, create more problems 
than they solve? As for modernity, or proto-modernity, Wang locates it 
in the Song dynasty (960–1279).  
He also posits Maoism as »an anti-modern modernity«—part of the global 
or world-historical movement away from ancient regimes but also against 
a universalizing capitalism and against the erasure of China’s own specifi-
cities and differences. This was the Maoist break with Stalinism after all, 
even if Stalin had to remain a proper name of the pantheon. This is to 
say, then, that the critique of universalism is alive and well in some spheres 
of Chinese intellectual political culture, beyond official pronouncements 
of the Chinese dream and the like. All of this is what makes it part of the 
general postcolonial world even if the specific keywords are not always in 
play. In sum, if one wants to truly engage China—the PRC, as opposed to 
its peripheries and the diasporic spaces which, however important, tend 
to dominate the conversation—then the postcolonial dimension, the 
ongoing encounter with the West, the historical baggage, the attempts to 
decolonize or counter Western discourses—has to be part of that 
engagement.  
To the social sciences?  
But if the postcolonial turn has happened in much of the humanities and 
to many historical inquiries, and if China is actually a compelling example 
of the historical and »actually existing« condition of postcoloniality, it 
remains nonetheless true that most of the social sciences (even the 
interpretive ones) as well as China Studies or Sinology have largely 
avoided that turn and kept to their traditional paths: a certain practice of 
(or claim to) »science« and objectivity, on the one hand, and a basis in 
language proficiency and empiricism on the other. As I have been 
suggesting, the fact of that turn does not suggest mere trendiness or 
faddishness but a useful, if rightfully contested and debatable, mini-
paradigm shift about the impact and scope and scale of the colonial and 
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imperial encounters on the West as much as on the former colonized 
and the Third World. There are indeed such things as academic fashions 
and fads, or certain formations of discourse or knowledge that are not 
compelling or enduring. But the postcolonial turn, especially but not 
only its critique or »provincialization« of universalisms, seems more akin 
to something like feminism and the analysis of gender: a »discovery« far 
too large, and far too connected to the world as it was and remains, as 
well as too widely adopted already, to be usefully resisted by any one 
discipline for any good, as opposed to gate-keeping, reason.  
But my point here is not to badger or browbeat China studies and the 
social sciences. The point I wish to make is that the postcolonial field 
sorely needs the social sciences as much as it needs to know more and 
do more with China. (One can say as well that the Chinese academe and 
intelligentsia need more engagement with the rest of the world, including 
Asia as opposed to the West; more postcolonial and global studies all 
around then.) The division between the humanities and the social sciences 
is a very powerful but also a very unfortunate and debilitating, ultimately 
arbitrary one. Speaking impressionistically as a long-standing literature, 
film, and humanities professor, I believe that all the texts have in a sense 
been more or less been worn out, with diminishing returns in regard to 
the endless production of readings or studies or commentaries. (This 
may also explain a return, away from »theory,« to more formalist and 
arts-appreciation modes of textual analysis, as well as the influence of 
strictly empirical studies like those of Franco Moretti.3) The basic game 
in recent years has been to return to formalism and aesthetics as opposed 
to theory and cultural studies and critique, in addition to »discovering« 
non-canonical and »hidden« writers, film-makers, and so on. (The latter 
is indeed worthwhile and welcome, but often bibliographic more than 
anything else.) This downsizing of ambition is understandable as at the 
end of the day the truly compelling questions and pressing problems of 
the present and recent past—I am thinking of political and social ones 
                                                
 
3  See for example Moretti (2013).  
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around new forms of power famously illustrated by Michel Foucault or 
Pierre Bourdieu, of things like the »Anthropocene,« of all the political 
failures in the current global conjuncture, the degradation of liberalism 
since the 1970s, the impact of immigration, the rise of terrorism, the 
demonization and failures of the state in general, and so on—are simply 
not best revealed or illumined through, say, the study of film and 
literature.4  
What is needed, in other words, is what C. W. Mills (1959) enduringly 
theorized as the sociological imagination, just as, put another way, some 
of these big, interpretive, political problems and questions must also be 
empirical questions. The empirical (or concrete) materiality is precisely 
the Achilles heel of humanistic inquiry, which either expresses great 
disinterest in the empirical and broadly contextual (in favor of aesthetics 
and formalism and timeless truths) or which dismisses the social sciences 
as rationalist and narrow and »non-theoretical.« Let us take a quick 
Chinese example or two: the dissident figure or artist, be it the famed 
performance artist (and tax evader) Ai Wei Wei, the blind human rights 
lawyer (and devout Christian) Chen Guancheng, the blogger Han Han 
(never really a dissident but decidedly middlebrow), and so on. When 
such figures are singled out by humanists—their texts, or their personages 
as texts—they represent the PRC and what is wrong with it, and what it 
was and is really like. The critic or journalist only sometimes says as 
much explicitly. But regardless, the texts/figures simply must seem so in 
order to do the work they do as representative Chinese or China. Ai is 
certainly an adept and successful artist, but he is neither especially 
popular or especially controversial or compelling within China itself, and 
he speaks so much and so contradictorily that it would in fact be hard to 
make a coherent social critic or thinker out of him. Not unlike Andy 
Warhol, perhaps, but with Chinese and »global civil society celebrity 
                                                
 
4  With notable exceptions of course (certain film-makers and novelists 
who are intensely interested in such things), that would in my mind only 
prove the general rule I am invoking.  
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human rights« characteristics. A liberal propagandist such as the novelist 
Yan Lianke—to take another example—can write a volume about the 
»great« famine of 1959–61 (The Four Books), and be celebrated abroad for 
great bravery and truth-telling, without any readers outside of China 
being aware of an intense debate in the mainland over the extent and 
scale of the famine as well as its causes (death estimates by Chinese 
academics range from 4 to 35 million).5 They stand for the truth of the 
PRC as revealed through »texts« of very particular individuals. This is in 
fact an old story, as when the anti-Maoist, pro-Dengist filmmakers of the 
1980s and early 1990s (e.g., Chen Kaige and Zhang Yimou) made 
memorable but historically tendentious and fantastical epic films decrying 
the Mao era as so much despotic feudalism and unmitigated misery. These 
were then taken by audiences abroad as directly representing recent 
Chinese history. 
The postcolonial or anti-orientalist critique of such gestures can be done 
at the level of representation (that they do not represent the whole or the 
one truth, are not especially popular or subversive, and so on). But what 
is needed is also the sociological and contextual analysis and more 
empirical detail: what are the consensus views about the Chinese 
government by Chinese citizens, for example? Does China lack »rule of 
law« and »human rights« or does it have some other system by which it 
operates consistently and more or less coherently? What really happened 
during the Great Leap communalization to lead it into famine, how big 
was that disaster, and relatedly, why are Western academics and audiences 
so invested in making the death numbers as large as possible? In short, 
how can we characterize Chinese society now or in the recent past, and 
what does, say, the variety of nationalisms and attitudes toward the 
legitimacy of the government tell us about the encounters with imperialism? 
                                                
 
5  See the discussions in Vukovich (2012) and Chun (2013) as well as Sun 
(2016), in addition to the more well-known high estimates by, e.g., Yang 
Jisheng (2013) Of course the foreign media and commentariat see the 
lower estimates as mere propaganda.  
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Some type of historical sociology seems imperative for not only 
understanding Chinese society in general but also Western societies’ 
responses to the rise of China, and China’s responses to Western 
dominance. These are not merely conceptual or speculative matters—
they need to be researched in a social-science way but brought into the 
comparative and postcolonial problematic or frame. One can even go so 
far as to say that sociological or other empirical work is needed to test or 
falsify any number of postcolonial or other theoretically driven inquiries 
and concepts. But with the added proviso that social science—I am 
thinking of a field such as politics in particular—needs to drop its 
scientific pretenses. As if there really were objective and universal truths 
or »facts«—shorn of interpretation and evaluation/judgment, no less—
to questions and problems of politics and society! If Max Weber were 
writing today, one can guess that he would engage the postcolonial 
problematic.  
As for China studies, its institutionalization in the US and outside of 
Europe as »area studies« has, as is well known, been overwhelmingly 
social scientific, with the added »bonus« of linguistically defined areas 
and a certain fetish or cult of language as a skeleton key for immediate 
access through all the doors and gates of China. (This also belies a strident 
if unspoken liberal humanism or universalism: know the language and 
know the other.) This makes it almost by definition opposed to 
postcolonial and post-structuralist or other forms of anti-universalistic, 
anti-liberal critique. In this sense, Europe is to be commended for keeping 
an older Sinology alive, that is, a more generalist non- or anti-discipline, 
of course still based in language and a long view of Chinese history and 
»culture,« that lacks the scientific pretensions of area studies. But of 
course the old Sinology was precisely the type of writing and knowledge 
production that Edward Said, among others, posited as orientalism. It 
too was self-defined as a field by being not-colonial or not-imperialistic 
but part of some universal human connection, as if the encounters 
between East and West, and not just specific individuals, were entirely 
innocent or happenstancey. It would now be hard to convince too many 
mainland intellectuals of this.  
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At any rate, much of this ground—the problems with area studies and 
China studies—has been debated before and I lack the space to add to it 
here.6 But there is one imperative that I think bodes well for the future 
of postcolonial studies as well as for the interpretive social sciences. This 
is not just the inexorable march of interdisciplinary studies, as individual 
disciplines realize their limits or run out of things to say and publish, nor 
the slow but sure dissemination of »theory« into all but the most resistant 
departments.  
The real imperative is the rise of China, not least as expressed through 
mainland immigration into Western/global universities and greater 
intellectual and »knowledge« flows between the PRC and the rest of the 
world. What this inevitably brings with it is that historical postcolonial 
condition—and contact, and »clash«—of China and its own others 
(including but not limited to the West of course). This is not necessarily 
going to be a sweet meeting of minds and a calm and harmonious 
conversation of mankind, thankfully, but it will most certainly—insofar 
as it resists the forces of homogeneity and conformity—continue to be 
                                                
 
6  There is also a growing literature on the social sciences and postcolonialism 
broadly defined. See for example Miyoshi and Harootunian from way 
back in 2002, though many of the pieces are not postcolonialist. See also 
Julian Go (2016) and the Postcolonial Politics series at Routledge Press. 
Systematic critiques of China studies specifically are relatively rare, as 
opposed to, say, South Asian studies or African studies, and so on. Again 
the China field has so far mostly avoided its postcolonial moment aside 
from critiques of an alleged Chinese colonialism of its own others and 
despite some others’ best efforts (and publications). For the latter see, in 
addition to the present author, Adrian Chan and for a proper historian’s 
approach to such questions, the work of James Hevia. More typical is the 
response that the China field needs to be even more social scientific. For 
that argument see for example Walder (2002). For a confused, ethnically-
based argument that China studies does not need Said or postcolonial 
studies and theory, yet does still need to talk about orientalism, systematic 
misrecognition, Western imperialism, and othering—but somehow not 
in a political but only a »Chinese« way that excludes the rest of the world, 
see Gu Ming Dong 2015.  
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interesting and productive of knowledge. Unless China and its intellectuals 
and students just suddenly decide to stop insisting on their particularities 
and differences (in understanding any number of things, from Mao 
Zedong to democracy to Tibet to religion to…), or unless China decides 
to just »become-the-same« as the normative US-West, there almost has to 
be a postcolonial »moment« for China studies and the social sciences. If 
so, it may well displace—supplement—the past, chiefly South Asian and 
»bourgeois national liberations« that have largely made up the historical 
contexts and bases for postcolonial studies to date, alongside the chiefly 
British (and to a lesser extent French) empires. The USA has tended to 
get lost in that formulation of the postcolonial field, just as much as the 
PRC. The rise of a more multipolar intellectual, political, and cultural 
world—of a China that is if anything bigger and more complicated and 
multifarious than »the West«—also bodes well for the eventual weakening 
of the scientific and methodological universalism of much of traditional 
social science. This can in the end only be a good and productive thing 
for the academy in general and not just the social sciences. Alternatively 
there could be a return to an older form of orientalist knowledge 
production: a dominance of hostility and Sinophobic writings and 
sentiment, even beyond the general, political anti-communism of the 
foreign China field.  
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